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This Essay examines the key strengths and limitations of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the US. financial reform
legislation written in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis under
considerable political pressure. The legislation's strengths include an emphasis
on stress testing, the creation of the Office of Financial Research, and a focus
on the regulation of the largest nonbank financial institutions. The Act,
however, does have several weaknesses. The legislation neither solves the
regulatory arbitrage problem, nor simplifies supervision, by increasing-not
decreasing-the number of regulators. It does not go nearly far enough in
terms of regulatory requirements for nonbanks. The legislation is overly
complex and uneven, resulting in weak to nonexistent supervision of certain
activities and excessive regulation of others. Also problematic is that the
legislation neither advances the quality of supervision and educational
opportunities for supervisors, nor provides sufficient governance when the
application of regulation becomes arbitrary. This Essay offers reforms to help
repair the Act's shortcomings, including strengthening the business and audit
lines of defense, creating more formal academic supervisory education
programs for supervisors, and instituting more effective ombudsman programs
within regulatory agencies.
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Introduction
The recent financial crisis wreaked havoc on the economies of developed
countries. In the United States, $17 trillion of household wealth was lost. From
2008 to 2009, the U.S. economy shed 8.3 million jobs,' roughly equivalent to
the entire population of New York City.2 In an effort to stem the crisis, the
federal government created a $700 billion relief package, the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP),3 and then provided an additional $787 billion in
economic stimulus through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.4
Europe continues to experience serious losses as the crisis continues. In
May 2011, the International Monetary Fund and the European Union agreed to
bail out Portugal with a $116 billion assistance package.5 Portugal's deal
1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED
STATES, OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT EDITION 390 (2011).
2. Population: Current Population Estimates, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
3. TARP was created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA),
which became law on October 3, 2008. TARP was established with the specific goal of stabilizing the
United States financial system and preventing a systemic collapse. Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, tit. I, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
4. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 became law on February 17, 2009
with the goals of economic stimulation and job creation. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in
scattered sections of U.S.C.).
5. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, Statement on Portugal by IMF Managing Director
Dominique Strauss-Kahn and European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn




followed a $146 billion6 package for Greece in May 2010,7 $110 billion for
Ireland in November 2010,8 and $4.6 billion for Iceland in 2008. While the
United Kingdom has not requested assistance from its peers, during the height
of the financial crisis, U.K. taxpayers made estimated gross commitments of
approximately $1.4 trillion9 to British banks.'0
With these kinds of losses and severe financial-industry disruptions, it is
not surprising that political leaders felt compelled to enact far-reaching
regulatory change. On January 7, 2009, merely four days into the 111th
Congress and before President Obama was sworn into office, a New York Times
editorial called for drastic change in the regulation of the financial services
industry, stating that "[a]nything less than a new rules-based regime would be
inadequate to the task of restoring confidence and, eventually, reviving the
economy."" Even earlier, at the height of the crisis in 2008, U.S. congressional
hearings also elicited calls for change.' 2
It was in this environment-one of political urgency and economic
anxiety-that Congress and President Obama enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.13 Crises and the pressure
of political expediency, however, rarely result in carefully considered
legislation. Accordingly, while Dodd-Frank provides some beneficial reforms
to the financial system, the legislation is uneven and does not sufficiently
address longstanding financial-services regulatory challenges.14
This Essay will examine Dodd-Frank's key strengths and limitations and
offer suggestions for additional regulatory and supervisory reforms that could
6. Emma Ross-Thomas & Jonathon Steams, EU Bets $146 Billion Greek Bailout To Avert
Contagion, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-02/eu-bets-146-
billion-in-greek-bailout-medicine-will-stop-contagion-threat.html.
7. David Labanyi, Ireland To Receive E85 Billion at 5.8% Interest Rate, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 28,
2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2010/1128/breakingl.html.
8. David Jolly, $2.5 Billion Is Added to Bailout for Iceland, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21/business/worldbusiness/21icebank.html.
9. Andrew Grice, f850bn: Official Cost of the Bank Bailout (and Still RBS Is Demanding
Another £l.5bn in Bonuses), INDEP. (U.K.), Dec. 4, 2009,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ 163850bn-official-cost-of-the-bank-bailout-
1833830.html.
10. The net figures will not be known for several years but are expected to be a very small
fraction of the gross, similar to TARP.
11. Editorial, Starting the Regulatory Work, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/08/opinion/08thul.html.
12. Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Genesis of the Current Economic Crisis: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, I10th Cong. 56-65 (2008) (written testimony
of Eugene A. Ludwig, Chief Executive Officer, Promontory Financial Group), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/LUDWIGEALTESTIMONYSENATEBANKINGASSUBMIT
TED_101608.pdf.
13. President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
14. Indeed, the legislation was passed six months before the congressionally-mandated
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, an examination into the domestic and global causes of the crisis, was
published. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) Report was published in January 2011. See
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1.
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further improve post-crisis financial stability. Specifically, Part II details the
following strengths of Dodd-Frank: the creation of the Office of Financial
Research (OFR), the regulation of nonbank, systemically important financial
institutions, and Dodd-Frank's emphasis on stress testing. Part III critiques the
legislation's limitations, including: regulatory arbitrage and supervisory
weakness; the exclusion of shadow banks from regulatory oversight reforms;
excessive and uneven regulation; and weakness in systemic regulation. Part IV
offers three additional avenues for reform that could make a positive
difference: strengthening the first and third lines of defense; creating more
formalized, academic supervisory education programs; and instituting
ombudsman programs in regulatory agencies. Part V concludes.
I. Strengths of Dodd-Frank
The strengths of Dodd-Frank lie primarily in three areas: the creation of
the OFR, the regulation of nonbank, systemically important financial
institutions, and the legislation's emphasis on stress testing.
A. Office ofFinancial Research
Conceptually, the single greatest advancement of Dodd-Frank is the
creation of the OFR.15 The establishment of the OFR brings together-for the
first time-a strong group of economists outside of the Federal Reserve for the
primary purpose of studying, modeling, and warning, against systemic events.
Previously, no governmental or private entity has had the primary mission of
identifying systemic events that could damage the U.S. economy. Arguably,
the Federal Reserve, with its army of talented economists, implicitly has this
responsibility; it certainly has the ability to do it.'7 Irrespective of the Federal
Reserve's responsibilities in this area, however, having a team outside the
traditional bureaucracy focus on these important problems will add
considerable value. Indeed, even if the OFR duplicates what the Federal
Reserve can and should accomplish, creating some healthy competition with
the Federal Reserve to identify hazards in the sea lanes should make a positive
difference for the creation of sound U.S. policy.
15. Dodd-Frank Act § 152, 124 Stat. at 1413 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5342); see Office of
Financial Research; Statement on Legal Entity Identification for Financial Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg.
74,146 (Nov. 30, 2010).
16. See, e.g., Sewell Chan, Agreement Is Near on New Overseer of Banking Risks, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/18/business/18regulate.html ('"There will be an
entity in charge of systemic risk-which no one now has the responsibility to do-and the consequence
of identifying systemic risk will be immediate remedial action to put that institution out of its misery,'
[Representative Barney] Frank said." (emphasis added)).
17. See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40877, SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE




It is important to note, however, that while the creation of the OFR on the
whole is a positive development, there are additional ways to improve its
design. Ideally, the OFR should be an independent agency, not an office in the
U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"). Dodd-Frank's placement of the
OFR within Treasury creates the possibility that the OFR's mission will be
compromised due to Treasury's inescapably political nature. The Treasury
Secretary represents the President's interests in the financial arena, and is not
an independent actor. Accordingly, one could question whether, in a
presidential election year, the OFR will be able to express its views freely as to
the dangers ahead, particularly if those dangers may have been caused by a
President's policies. Therefore, while it should be stressed that the OFR
represents an improvement over the status quo, policymakers should realize
that its placement within the Treasury could limit its overall effectiveness.
B. Regulation ofNonbank Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Section 113 of Dodd-Frank brings nonbank, systemically important
financial institutions into the bank supervisory framework-a development of
potentially enormous significance.' 8 Historically, most nonbank financial
companies have operated within a much lighter regulatory environment. For
example, many of the mortgage lenders at the heart of the financial crisis were
unregulated or underregulated, state-licensed entities.
Unregulated and underregulated entities have been able to compete with
banks, often in precisely the same product lines. As noted, mortgage brokers
are an example of such underregulated entities.19 These entities, in part because
they are underregulated, need not adhere to the strict underwriting standards
bank regulators would require, and can slip through the patchwork of state
banking regulations that might otherwise constrain them. Such practices, along
with lower costs due to a lack of regulation, make mortgage brokers very
competitive and tend to lead the marketplace in a more aggressive direction,
undercutting consumer wellbeing and safe operation. Moreover, very large
nonbank financial enterprises could cause a systemic event, as was the case
with American International Group (AIG). Therefore, the ability of government
now to place at least the largest of these nonbank financial entities within a
bank regulatory envelope should help to stabilize the financial system.
Specifically, section 113 of Dodd-Frank grants the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC)-another creation of the legislation, discussed in
Section II.E-the authority to designate large nonbank financial institutions as
"systemically important" and bring them into the systemic supervisory
18. Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat. at 1398 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
19. Jihad C. Dagher & Ning Fu, What Fuels the Boom Drives the Bust: Regulation and the
Mortgage Crisis 2-3 (June 9, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstractid=1728260.
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framework of the Federal Reserve. Bringing these large and systemically
important firms into this supervisory framework will enable them to be
regulated for safety and soundness purposes, thereby helping to prevent them
from landing at the center of a future financial crisis.
Section 113 is, overall, a positive step forward for strengthening the
regulatory system post-crisis. It is important to note, however, that it is not a
complete remedy; challenges remain regarding the supervision of nonbank
financial institutions. First, smaller nonbank financial entities will continue to
be able to exist in an unregulated or underregulated environment, creating a
potential systemic trigger, as was the case with the unregulated mortgage
brokers that drove the overall market toward laxity and instability.
Second, while the FSOC has broad latitude to determine which financial
enterprises qualify as systemic, it appears that the FSOC may exclude many
sizable nonbank financial companies from the systemic supervisory net
(although Dodd-Frank does allow the FSOC to regulate some smaller entities in
part by designating an "activity" as systemic). The FSOC is likely to be
conservative in using its authority for three reasons. First, as discussed later in
this Essay, the FSOC is a creature of Treasury, which is an extension of the
President, who is a political actor. Designating an institution as systemically
important could have undesirable political consequences. Second, it is
oftentimes easier not to act than to gain consensus of a body, such as the FSOC,
that has a variety of constituencies, each with its own agenda. Third, federal
regulators and state supervisors may lose considerable regulatory power over
financial institutions that the FSOC deems to be systematically important, as
such institutions are then placed under enhanced Federal Reserve supervision.
C. Emphasis on Stress Testing
Dodd-Frank requires the Federal Reserve Board to conduct annual stress
tests of bank holding companies with more than $50 billion in assets. Banks
must also conduct their own stress tests. Specifically, banks with assets greater
than $10 billion must conduct annual stress tests, and those with more than $50
billion must conduct semi-annual stress tests.2 0 This emphasis on stress testing
is a critical step forward. Prior to the crisis, surprisingly few financial
institutions put themselves through stress testing exercises. In the depths of the
crisis, however, regulators conducted stress tests on the largest U.S. banks with
what seems to have been great success both for the health of the institutions and
the marketplace.2 1
20. Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 124 Stat. at 1423 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). Note that there is
a redundancy in the stress testing; one should keep in mind, however, that in conducting its stress tests,
the Federal Reserve has an eye toward macroprudential responsibilities, whereas the bank largely
focuses on microprudential issues.
21. A U.S. Government Accountability Office's September 2010 report found that "[t]he




Specifically, from February to April 2009, federal bank regulatory
agencies conducted the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) on
the nineteen domestic bank holding companies with assets over $100 billion.
The SCAP estimated losses, revenues, and reserve needs for the nineteen
companies in 2009 and 2010 under two macroeconomic scenarios-baseline
and more adverse-with the goal of ensuring that each bank would be well-
capitalized under both scenarios.22 Upon releasing the results of the SCAP,
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bemanke used the opportunity as a way to calm
markets, stating:
The results released today should provide considerable comfort to investors and the public.
The examiners found that nearly all the banks that were evaluated have enough Tier I capital
to absorb the higher losses envisioned under the hypothetical adverse scenario. Roughly half
the firms, though, need to enhance their capital structure to put greater emphasis on common
equity, which provides institutions the best protection during periods of stress. Many of the
institutions have already taken actions to bolster their capital buffers and are well-positioned
to raise capital from private sources over the next six months.
2 3
The direct impact of the SCAP on the markets is difficult to discern. The
results were released at the same time as a relatively positive employment
report 24 and a disappointing U.S. government bond auction.2 5 However, a CNN
report on May 8, 2009, the day after the release of the SCAP results, simply
stated, "[s]tocks rallied as investors breathed a sigh of relief that the results
weren't worse."26
The key lesson from the SCAP on the importance of stress testing is that
markets gave credence to the results of the tests. This point is evident from
coverage of financial markets on May 6, 2009, just prior to the release of the
results. For example, as reported in the Financial Times:
U.S. stocks slipped yesterday as investors worried about the government's stress tests on
banks took profits following a stellar previous session that took the benchmark S&P 500 index
into positive territory for the year. Speculation about the results of the tests on banks' balance
capital adequacy." U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-861, BANK STRESS TEST OFFERS
LESSONS AS REGULATORS TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS To STRENGTHEN SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0861.pdf.
22. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforegibcreg20090424al.pdf.
23. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement by Chairman Ben S.
Bemanke: Statement Regarding the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (May 7, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bemankescap20090507.htm.
24. Alexandra Twin, Wall Street Extends the Rally, CNN MONEY (May 8, 2009),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/08/markets/markets newyork/index.htm.
25. Alan Rappeport, US Regulators Tell Banks To Add $74.6 Billion in Capital After Stress
Tests, FIN. TIMES (May 8, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8eab6e76-3b66-1 lde-ba91-
00144feabdcO.html
26. Twin, supra note 24.
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sheets continued to dominate Wall Street, with reports suggestini that 10 of the 19 tested
banks may need to boost their capital to weather a deeper recession.
Critically, Treasury and the Federal Reserve also made clear that Treasury
was prepared to fill the void pending the results of the tests. As Chairman
Bernanke stated, "Our government, through the Treasury Department, stands
ready to provide whatever additional capital may be necessary to ensure that
our banking system is able to navigate a challenging economic downturn."2 8
Accordingly, the SCAP strongly suggests that stress tests, if done
properly, are able to build important market confidence and stability. In a
speech reflecting on the SCAP one year after its conclusion, Chairman
Bernanke pointed to several factors as evidence of its success: the majority of
the nineteen firms that needed capital following the stress tests were able to
raise the capital in the market (as opposed to receiving assistance from
Treasury); most of the nineteen firms had repaid TARP money that they had
received during the crisis; share prices of the nineteen firms had generally
increased; and banks' access to debt markets and interbank and short-term
funding markets had improved.29 Chairman Bernanke also noted that the
average ratio of Tier 1 common capital to risk-weighted assets rose from 6.7
percent to 8.5 percent. 30
It is important to note that stress testing per se is not a panacea. Indeed,
poorly performed stress tests may lead to a false sense of complacency or
undercut market confidence. The way stress tests are conducted is critical.3 1 For
example, it appears that the European stress tests have not been effective or
helpful supervisory tools. In fact, one commentator has even gone so far as to
call them "farcical," 32 as the Irish banking system collapsed just four months
after the country's banks passed their stress tests.33 Additionally, a requirement
for frequent, periodic stress testing runs the risk that the tests will become rote
over time and, accordingly, less useful. It is critical that both regulators and
financial institutions take each and every stress test seriously. As the world
27. Kiran Stacey, Stress Test Concerns Motivate Investors To Take Their Profits, FIN. TIMES
(May 6, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9af8a5f8-39d7-1 lde-b82d-00144feabdcO.html.
28. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The Federal Reserve System has listed four principles key to effective stress testing. These
principles include: 1) A banking organization's stress testing framework should include activities and
exercises that are tailored to and sufficiently capture the banking organization's exposures, activities,
and risks; 2) An effective stress testing framework employs multiple conceptually sound stress testing
activities and approaches; 3) An effective stress testing framework is forward-looking and flexible; and
4) Stress test results should be clear, actionable, well supported, and inform decision-making. See
Proposed Guidance on Stress Testing for Banking Organizations with More than $10 Billion in Total
Consolidated Assets, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,072, 35,074 (June 15, 2011).






continues to become more interconnected and volatile, the risk rises that
unforeseen events that could have major impacts on the financial system.
II. Limitations of Dodd-Frank
As discussed above, Dodd-Frank makes several important contributions to
financial stability; however, it also has some significant limitations. Some of
these limitations were evident at conception, and others will emerge over time.
The most critical limitations include: provisions that continue to allow for
regulatory arbitrage and supervisory weakness; exclusions of shadow banks
from regulatory oversight; a tendency towards excessive regulation; excessive
and uneven regulation of trading activities; and limitations regarding systemic
oversight.
A. Regulatory Arbitrage and Supervisory Weakness
Regulatory arbitrage, the ability of a financial institution to select and/or
change its charter to avoid tough regulation and supervision, was part of the
witches' brew from which the financial crisis emerged. Regulatory arbitrage
undercuts sound regulation and supervision.
Regulatory arbitrage may lead to a race-to-the-bottom among regulators
seeking to expand the scope of their oversight. As financial institutions flock to
the least stringent enforcer of regulations generally, the institutions themselves
may begin to exhibit greater volatility, thus leading to a higher failure rate.
Indeed, countries that tended to do better in the crisis have unified prudential
supervisory systems. In jurisdictions where a professionalized prudential
supervisor existed, such as Canada, Australia, and Japan, institutions caught in
the crisis fared better. The bank failure rate provides startling evidence to
support this assertion. In comparison to the multitude of bank failures across
the United States during the financial crisis-25 in 2008,34 140 in 2009,35 and
157 in 20103-no banks of significant size failed during this time period in
Canada, Australia, or Japan.
34. Bank Failures in Brief 2008, FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
35. Bank Failures in Brief 2009, FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2009/index.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
36. Bank Failures in Brief 2010, FDIC,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2010/index.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
37. Kevin G. Hall, Few Foreclosures, No Bank Failures: Canada Offers Lessons,
MCCLATCHY (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/11/106599/few-foreclosures-no-
bank-failures.html.
38. See AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 69, available at
http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Documents/APRA AR 2010 all.pdf; GRP. OF THIRTY, THE
STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
195-96 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-
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Dodd-Frank, however, does not sufficiently address this type of regulatory
arbitrage and weak supervision. While the legislation eliminates the OTS,40
thus reducing the number of U.S. bank regulators from four to three,
possibilities for regulatory arbitrage still remain. These opportunities are
particularly available to smaller institutions, which can avoid regulation by not
including a bank in their financial organization.
To rectify these challenges, financial reformers should explore best
practices from the largely successful regulatory models in Canada, Australia,
and Japan, as discussed above. Supervisory systems in these countries are
almost entirely focused on prudential issues related to financial services
companies; they do not engage in securities or consumer issues, or in the case
of Australia, even compliance issues. Also important, supervisory entities in
these countries do not compete with one another. For all of these reasons,
especially the efficacy of a unified prudential regulator, the United States has
much to learn to improve its own regulatory system.
B. Exclusion of Shadow Banks from Regulatory Oversight Reforms
While several institutions in the "shadow banking system" landed at the
center of the financial crisis, Dodd-Frank excludes the shadow banking system
from some of its key provisions and from bank-like regulation and supervision.
The shadow banking system includes investment banks, mortgage brokers,
hedge funds, and other financial institutions that operate freely in capital
markets beyond the reach of traditional regulatory mechanisms. While bank
deposit-taking and lending are important to the U.S. economy, prior to the
41financial crisis, the shadow banking system provided even more funding.
Excluding shadow banking institutions from tough regulation and supervision
poses several challenges.
First, the exclusion creates entire classes of institutions that can fail and
create a systemic or near-systemic crisis, like thrift institutions in the late
421980s. Second, institutions subject to lower regulatory burdens will have a
considerable competitive advantage vis-A-vis banks in the short run. This
advantage will inevitably drive traditionally-regulated institutions to engage in
09/english/panels/fa/papers/faO223cbl-837-3-e.pdf. The only failure during the 2004-2010 period was
not of a bank, but of a superannuation institution, similar to a U.S. pension fund manager.
39. Shigeru Sato & Shingo Kawamoto, Incubator Bank Failure Triggers Deposit Insurance
Cap, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-10/incubator-bank-
failure-triggers-deposit-insurance-cap.html. The failure of Japan's Incubator Bank was the first failure to
trigger the Japanese government's insurance cap in forty years. Analysts point to this failure as being
separate from the "bubble collapse" and due to the bank's breach of Japanese banking rules.
40. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
313, 124 Stat. 1376, 1523 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413).
41. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 32.
42. A summary of the savings-and-loan crisis is provided by the FDIC at The S&L Crisis: A




riskier activities to earn greater rates of return on capital. Third, banks engaging
in financial activities with shadow banking organizations may face more
counterparty risk than when dealing with covered institutions.
Ultimately, history has shown that if a large shadow institution gets into
serious trouble, regulators will feel pressure to resolve the matter at the expense
of the regulated sector, the government, or both, as exemplified by the bailout
of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998. Prior to its receiving
assistance, LTCM had "amassed more than $1 trillion in notional amount of
OTC derivatives and $125 billion of securities on $4.8 billion of capital without
the knowledge of its major derivatives counterparties or federal regulators."
In the Federal Reserve's belief, a failure of LTCM would have had a
"systemic"44 impact. Accordingly, when the hedge fund faced near collapse,
the Federal Reserve coordinated LTCM's $3.6 billion recapitalization by
fourteen major over-the-counter derivatives dealers.45 AIG is another example
of this phenomenon. AIG, which operated, in large part, in the shadow banking
system, received one of the largest bailouts-over $47 billion46-frOm
Treasury during the financial crisis. As reforms move forward, policymakers
should keep a close eye on the shadow banking system and move towards the
proper regulation of this sector.
C. Excessive Regulation
Many would argue that the lax regulatory environment of recent decades
was one of the primary drivers of the financial crisis. During this period, key
economic policymakers believed that the free market was the best-if not the
only-useful regulator. As a result of inadequate regulation arising from
misplaced faith in the power of free markets, the leverage ratios of some
broker-dealers in the shadow banking sector rose to levels as high as 40:1.47 As
Senate Banking Chairman Christopher Dodd stated to Chairman Bernanke
during his 2009 confirmation hearing:
I admire what you've done over the last two years. But we shouldn't have had to go through
what we did for the last two years had there been cops on the street, doing their jobs, telling us
what was going on and allowing us to avoid the problems in the first place.
48
43. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 48.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 47-48.
46. Peter Schroeder, Treasury Recovers $2 Billion in Bailout Money from AIG, THE HILL: ON
THE MONEY BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-
institutions/I 77443-treasury-recovers-2-billion-in-bailout-money-from-aig
47. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 65.
48. Chris Isidore, Bernanke Faces Fire at Confirmation Hearing, CNN MONEY (Dec. 3,
2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/economy/bemanke-hearing/.
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Dodd-Frank, however, severely overcompensates for lax regulation. Too
many of the legislation's components are largely unnecessary, and its sheer
magnitude could actually challenge safety and soundness by focusing an
excessive amount of management attention on less critical issues.
Had regulators exercised their authority robustly prior to the financial
crisis, many of the challenges Dodd-Frank addresses could have been avoided.
For example, bank regulators had expansive powers under their general and
comprehensive safety and soundness authority to limit poor banking practices.
The Federal Reserve, under the Home Owner's Equity Protection Act, could
have done more to control the home mortgage crisis. 4 9 Likewise, the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, the regulator charged with overseeing
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could have more closely monitored the GSEs
with the proper resources from Congress.so In addition, the SEC and the
Federal Reserve could have controlled excess leverage and liquidity with their
authority to impose additional capital requirements on institutions for the
purposes of promoting safety and soundness.
In short, there is a very real danger that the regulatory explosion coming
out of Dodd-Frank will so distract the regulated entities and regulators that they
will not have the time or focus to address real safety and soundness matters.
Moreover, the weight of this regulatory barrage threatens to depress the
earnings potential of financial services companies, creating the risk they will be
unable to deal with inevitable financial downturns.
D. Excessive and Uneven Regulation of Trading
Two components of Dodd-Frank require particularly expensive and
complicated changes concerning bank trading activities, which only
tangentially contributed to the crisis. Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, the "Volcker
Rule,"5 amends the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 to prohibit any
"banking entity" from engaging in proprietary trading and from sponsoring or
investing in a hedge or private equity fund. It also requires systemically
important nonbank financial companies to carry additional capital and comply
with other quantitative limits on such activities. 5 2 Section 716, the "Lincoln
Amendment,"53 requires that certain derivatives activities be conducted outside
the bank and instead in an affiliate of the bank.
49. The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, Illth Cong. (2010) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjanl41O.html.
50. FIN. CRisis INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 40.
51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
52. Id. § 619(a), 124 Stat. at 1376-77 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).




It is not clear that these activities are inherently unsafe. Furthermore, they
have added to bank profitability.5 4 The degree to which the Volcker Rule and
the Lincoln Amendment prove to be troublesome will depend upon how they
are ultimately regulated. Dodd-Frank gives the regulators considerable latitude
to narrow or expand the proscriptive nature of these amendments. However,
even relatively narrow regulations that effectuate these provisions will most
likely undercut the health of the affected institutions.
This is not to say that all trading activity is safe, just like all lending is not
safe. Some activities are new, some are less well-controlled than is desirable,
and some are not entirely fair to counterparties. It should, therefore, be the
decision of the supervisor to draw careful rules to differentiate between safe
and unsafe practices. Regulators should be encouraged to promulgate proper
requirements to make sure banks act in a prudent manner. Both the Volcker
Rule and the Lincoln Amendment risk making banks less safe and sound by
using wide-ranging prohibitions and convoluted "solutions" where the
supervisor's targeted interventions are more appropriate.
The Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment suggest a
misunderstanding of the importance of trading activities in modern finance in
several ways. First, both of these Dodd-Frank components make an underlying
assumption that the "banking book" (also known as the "accrual book"), which
is essentially a bank's loans, is safe and stable. This, however, is not always the
case. The stability of the banking book, the heart of a banking organization,
depends upon underwriting standards and the state of the economy. Whether
the loans held within the banking book are safer or riskier than trading
activities remains to be seen. Most importantly, today there are considerable
pressures on banks to mark the banking book to market.55 Regardless of
requirements for the bank to mark these books to market, the marketplace
increasingly reviews a bank's accrual statements and tends to value the banking
organization based on perceptions of mark-to-market valuations with respect to
the accrual book. 6 Accordingly, the banking book can serve as the leading
cause of volatility for banks and thrifts, as the market makes its own judgment
about the quality of the predominately whole loan assets that comprise their
banking books, with concerns about low quality banking books feeding
liquidity and solvency concerns that are reflected through increased volatility in
institutions' stock prices and funding costs.
54. E.g., Andrew Osterland, Volcker Rule Could Change Bank Profit Dynamics, INV. NEWS
(Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20111016/REG/310169970.
55. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi, Will Mark-to-Market Fix Save the Banks?, TIME (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1884290,00.html; Jeremy Newman, In
Defense of Mark-to-Market, FoRBES (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/08/18/mark-to-
market-banks-economy-opinions-contributors-accounting.html.
56. But see Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity
Pricing, 45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 358, 377 (2008) (showing that mark-to-market accounting can lead to
"distortions and contagion ... in illiquid markets in times of crisis", and so should be a disfavored form
of valuation during such times).
193
Yale Journal on Regulation
Second, banks overcome the inherent volatility in their banking books
through their trading activities, particularly today through their derivatives
activities conducted in their treasury operations. By making these activities
more complicated if not impossible to conduct, restrictions on trading activities
mandated by Dodd-Frank actually undercut the safety and soundness of
banking operations. In addition, proprietary trading activities can add to a
bank's understanding of the marketplace. These activities help to ensure that
banks can attract top talent and help it innovate by creating trading activities for
risk management purposes.
Third and specifically regarding the Volcker Rule, while removing
proprietary trading activities from banking entities might be a good idea in
theory, in practice, these restrictions pose considerable challenges to the
financial system. While bank deposit taking and lending activity is important to
the U.S. economy, in today's marketplace, financial institutions' business
customers must utilize capital markets to meet their financial needs. For
example, through trading, banks make financial products available to
customers, provide liquidity to the financial system, and mitigate their own risk
exposures. By restricting trading activities, the Volcker Rule risks inhibiting
U.S. competitiveness in global financial markets and banks' ability to innovate
and stay relevant. No longer do customers use banks simply for making
deposits and taking loans; today, customers use banks for currency hedging,
management of interest-rate risk, the elimination of an unwanted credit risk, or
fixing the price of a commodity, among other services. These activities
necessitate trading and market-making activities. Accordingly, banks have
developed an array of financial products and services to meet customer
demand.
Finally, to use these complex financial products, a bank must manage its
own risk exposures. Banks are able to manage such exposures by trading in
anticipation of customer flow, such as through the purchase of commodities or
currencies. In some cases, banks can even hold inventory in anticipation of
customer demands. While one may argue that banks could hedge exposure at
the time the trade is initiated by the customer, it is often impractical in terms of
risk management to hedge a customer's exposure in the spot market due to
market illiquidity or a competitor's trading against a bank's open position.
Regulations, such as the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment, limit the
number of tools to which banks have access to manage their internal risk, and
may correspondingly make the banks' performance more volatile.
In its 2011 study of the Volcker Rule, the FSOC asserted that it is
challenging to differentiate clearly between market-making and proprietary
trading, stating that market-making trades "often evidence outwardly similar




objectives."s? Therefore, regulators must be extremely careful in interpreting
the Volcker Rule so as to not cause huge obstacles to the financial
intermediation system.
E. Weakness in Systemic Regulation
While not perfect, coordination among federal agencies during the
financial crisis was respectable. The President's Working Group on Financial
Markets, created by Executive Order 12631 following the 1987 stock market
crash, worked well.58 Dodd-Frank correctly recognizes the importance of
governmental coordination in respect to systemic issues and formalizes the
Working Group into the FSOC.59 The FSOC is chaired by the Secretary of the
Treasury and consists of an additional nine voting members, including the
principals of the federal regulatory agencies, and five non-voting members. 60
The FSOC has a myriad of authorities; many are new to financial supervision,
including the power to decide which non-financial firms are to be considered
systemic. In and of itself, the FSOC is a positive step in the direction of a more
57. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOmmENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS
ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
1 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study/20final%201%2
018%2011%20rg.pdf.
58. Executive Order 12631 of March 18, 1988: Working Group on Financial Markets, 53 Fed.
Reg. 9421 (Mar. 22, 1988). The Working Group was created to maintain investor confidence and to
enhance the integrity, efficiency, order, and competitiveness of the nation's financial markets. Id. at
9421.
59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321).
60. According to its website, the FSOC's voting members include:
The Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as the Chairperson of the FSOC, the Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, the Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration Board,
and an independent member with insurance expertise that is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for a six-year term.
Financial Stability Oversight Council Created Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FAQ%20-
%20FinancialStabilityOversightCouncilOctober20lOFINALv2.pdf (last updated Oct. 2010). Nonvoting
members who serve in an advisory capacity include:
The Director of the OFR, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, a state insurance
commissioner selected by the state insurance commissioners, a state banking supervisor
chosen by the state banking supervisors, and a state securities commissioner designated by the
state securities supervisors. The state nonvoting members have two-year terms.
Id.
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clearly organized and comprehensive regulatory environment for the largest
financial enterprises.61 The construction of the FSOC, however, has two key
challenges that are likely to impede its effectiveness.
The first potential challenge to the FSOC's status as an apolitical regulator
is that the Treasury Secretary, as its chair, has a great deal of power-more so
than ever before-in regulatory and supervisory matters.62 In prior decades,
Congress, as a matter of public policy, had been deeply wary of giving this kind
of authority to a Treasury Secretary, a member of the President's Cabinet
whose position is inherently political in nature. While Congress in Dodd-Frank
appears to have overlooked this potential politicization of the regulatory
process, the power of the Treasury Secretary over the FSOC will likely give
rise to some levels of controversy in the years ahead.
A second challenge is that because the FSOC does not encompass all of
the federal government agencies involved in the financial industry, such as the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the U.S.
Department of Labor, it may not feel empowered to deal with issues that are
important and financial in nature, but involve non-FSOC agencies. For
example, the FSOC has not acted regarding the controversy over the so-called
foreclosure "robo-signing" 63 techniques used by some mortgage servicers. Yet,
HUD, a key stakeholder in this issue, will not be able to use the FSOC platform
to deal with this issue. Foreclosure techniques, including robo-signing, are of
systemic importance to the U.S. housing market and are arguably something
the FSOC should examine. Therefore, the FSOC may not address significant
financial matters, perhaps because it sees its jurisdiction as limited to its
member agencies.
Finally, the formality and high profile of the FSOC could result in a less
useful forum for debate and resolution of important issues. One can predict that
more substantively important matters will be decided in small groups behind
closed doors than will be decided by the FSOC.
Hl. What Else Could Be Done To Make a Positive Difference
Although Dodd-Frank is a massive piece of financial regulatory reform
legislation, there are still several additional measures that could genuinely
further improve U.S. regulatory and supervisory systems and financial stability.
These measures include the following: strengthening the first and third lines of
61. The FSOC is charged with "identifying threats to the financial stability of the United
States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the United
States financial system." Financial Stability Oversight Commission, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Pages/FSOC-index.aspx (last updated Dec. 5, 2011, 4:38 PM).
62. Interesting to note, as well, is that the FSOC is staffed by and physically located within the
Treasury.
63. Robo-signing is the process by which foreclosure documents are signed without actually




defense of the risk management model; capturing nonbanks in a supervisory
net;6 creating a single prudential supervisory mechanism; increasing the
educational excellence of our regulatory and supervisory personnel; and
enhancing ombudsman programs at the federal financial supervisory agencies.
Below are three expanded suggestions for improving financial stability:
strengthening management and auditing standards; creating more formalized
supervisory education programs; and instituting ombudsman programs in all
regulatory agencies.
A. Strengthening the First and Third Lines ofDefense
Risk management in the financial sector consists of three lines of defense:
(1) quality of management, (2) risk and compliance, and (3) audit. As with
many defensive strategies, the first line is the most important. While Dodd-
Frank addresses the first line of defense through regulations on executive
compensation,66 which will enable shareholders to cast advisory votes on
compensation and "golden parachute" arrangements ,67 more can be done.
Governance, culture, professional credentials, and succession planning, are all
critical to ensuring strong management. In fact, much of Dodd-Frank's
elaborate regulatory structure and requirements could be simplified if a stronger
first line of defense were required.
Policymakers should also focus on improving the third line of defense:
audit. Both external and internal audits are critical to protecting a financial
institution. External audits provide a basis for corporate boards and investors to
ensure that asset valuations and accounting are correct. Indeed, oftentimes the
failures of financial firms are closely intertwined with lapses in the oversight of
their external auditors. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
investigations have been launched into the role of its auditor, Ernst & Young.
In March 2010, a court-appointed examiner issued a report analyzing the
shortcomings in Ernst & Young's audit of Lehman Brothers:
Ernst & Young took no steps to question or challenge the non-disclosure by Lehman of its use
of$50 billion oftemporary, off-balance sheet transactions. Colorable claims exist that Ernst &
Young did not meet professional standards, both in investigating Lee's allegations and in
connection with its audit and review of Lehman's financial statements.6
64. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
65. See supra Part II.A.
66. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L, No. 111-203, §
951, 124 Stat. 137, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
67. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Rules on "Say on Pay" and Proxy Vote Reporting (Oct.
18, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-198.
68. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 21, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 BR.
113 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 08-1355(JMP)), available at
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%201.pdf.
197
Yale Journal on Regulation
Internal audits are used to ensure that risk management and compliance
systems are working properly and that businesses are operating within the law.
This function will become even more essential as financial and designated non-
financial companies strive to implement the myriad of new regulations imposed
by Dodd-Frank, especially those regarding the newly emerging regulatory area
of systemic risk. It is likely that some of the newly imposed regulatory
examinations on systemically important institutions could spread to smaller
entities.69 Internal auditors are critical to ensuring that institutions meet all of
these changes.
Remarkably, auditing remains conspicuously absent from post-financial
crisis analysis and legislative reform, even though valuations approved by
external audit turned out to be wrong in many cases. In fact, nowhere in Dodd-
Frank is there a single reference to internal auditing. 70 Going forward,
policymakers should place a renewed emphasis on audit-both external and
internal-and the deep value that it adds to the safety and soundness of
financial institutions.
B. Supervisory Education
Education is critical to producing competent, thorough, and serious
supervisors. Today, it is possible to get advanced degrees in dozens of subjects.
There is, however, no U.S. advanced degree program or undergraduate program
in regulation and supervision.7 Financial supervisors still learn mostly on the
job in an apprenticeship model that is similar to that of legal and medical
training a century ago. Establishing formal academic training programs for
financial institution supervisors needs to be a priority for governments around
the world. Educational programs and academia can provide deep resources of
factual information for solutions to challenges within financial market
supervision and regulation. Professionalizing academic training in this area
would surely result in substantial benefits to the global supervisory system.
69. Lee A. Meyerson, Reflections on Dodd-Frank: A Look Back and a Look Forward, HARV.
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pursuing careers in financial regulation, however. See, e.g., Degree Programs: Securities and Financial
Regulation, GEORGETOWN LAW SCH., http://www.law.georgetown.edulgraduate/securities.cfm (last
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With greater regulatory and supervisory involvement in financial
institutions' day-to-day operations, the chances for error grow. Financial
regulatory agencies should institute ombudsman programs globally.
Ombudsman programs hold the promise to minimize problems that arise from
unintended mistakes. It should be noted, however, that ombudsman programs
should not be a way for weaker enterprises to avoid supervisory rigor-and the
success of such programs at other regulatory agencies suggests that this will not
be the case. 72 Well-run ombudsman programs have the benefit of both ensuring
fairness-thereby raising respect for the supervisory service-and elevating
supervisory rigor, as one often learns best from one's own mistakes.
Conclusion
In sum, the regulatory framework emerging from the financial crisis is a
hodgepodge, created in a legislative environment of extreme stress. Dodd-
Frank provides tools to strengthen the stability of the financial system, namely
through the OFR, the regulation of nonbank systemically important financial
institutions, and the emphasis on stress testing. But there is still more work to
be done. Dodd-Frank's limitations center on its inability to address regulatory
arbitrage and weak supervision sufficiently, its exclusion of shadow banks from
regulatory oversight reforms (the dangers of which were shown by the virtual
collapses of both LTCM and AIG), and its overzealous regulation of other
financial institutions; excessive and uneven regulation of trading, as
exemplified by the Volcker Rule and Lincoln Amendment; and its weakness in
systemic regulation, as illustrated by the structure of the FSOC. All, however,
is not lost. There are numerous opportunities to improve, namely by focusing
regulatory efforts on three main goals: ensuring strong management and
effective auditing of financial institutions; improving supervisory education;
and instituting ombudsman programs within financial institutions globally.
72. Ombudsman programs have been established at several regulatory agencies. See, eg.,
Office of the Ombudsman, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/ombudsman (last visited
Dec. 6, 2011); Office of the Ombudsman, FED. HOUS. INS. AGENCY,
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=337 (last visited Dec. 6, 2011); Ombudsman for the Federal
Reserve System, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/ombudsman.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2011).
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